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SUMMARY
Due to its substantially lower prevalence of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) relative to other areas of
Great Britain, Scotland was designated as an oﬃcially (bovine) TB-free region in 2009. This
paper investigates resultant possibilities for reducing surveillance by developing risk-based
alternatives to current 4-year testing of eligible herds. A model of freedom of infection was used
to develop strategies that speciﬁcally tested herds that are at risk of infection but would probably
not be identiﬁed by slaughterhouse meat inspection. The performance of current testing is
mimicked by testing all herds that slaughter fewer than 25% of their total stock per year and
regularly import animals from high-incidence areas of England and Wales or from Ireland. This
system oﬀers a cost reduction by requiring 25% fewer herd and animal tests and 25% fewer false
positives.
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INTRODUCTION
Surveillance for exotic diseases is becoming increas-
ingly challenged by changes in international trading
patterns, and is at least partially driven by increases in
commercial livestock production in less industrialized
countries. These challenges are exacerbated by shifts
in global climate patterns that have resulted in
changing agricultural systems and changing vulner-
ability to diﬀerent diseases. This is also complicated
by the recent global economic recession, making
cost savings an essential component of any surveil-
lance system. In this environment, risk-based surveil-
lance based on statistically rigorous evidence oﬀers
opportunities both to reduce cost and better identify
potential outbreaks of disease [1].
One example where a risk-based surveillance strat-
egy could be exploited is for bovine tuberculosis
(bTB) in Scotland. bTB is caused by Mycobacterium
bovis and is a zoonotic disease that continues to be a
major problem to the cattle population in Great
Britain (GB) and Ireland [2–6]. In increasingly large
areas of England and Wales the prevalence of bTB
continues to rise (see Defra website [7]). However, the
prevalence in Scotland has remained at a very low le-
vel throughout this period and there is little evidence
that prevalence is increasing [8]. Due to regularly re-
cording a prevalence of <0.1% of non-introduced
cases, Scotland was granted status as an oﬃcially
(bovine) TB-free (OTF) region on 8 September
2009 [9]. However, in order to retain OTF status
Scotland must continue to demonstrate maintenance
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of freedom from disease. As a result, new bTB con-
trols were introduced shortly after the granting of
OTF status not only because of the proximity to
England and Wales but also in the light of the recent
German and Swiss experience of relying on slaugh-
terhouse surveillance alone [10–13]. However, by im-
plementing a well-designed risk-based surveillance
strategy, it may be possible for Scotland to continue
to eﬀectively demonstrate freedom from disease while
testing considerably fewer animals than are tested
under the current surveillance systems.
In Scotland ante-mortem testing for bTB is cur-
rently performed using the single intradermal com-
parative cervical tuberculin test (SICCT). The SICCT
requires one visit to the farm to inoculate the animals
with a bovine and an avian tuberculin and a second
follow-up visit 72 h later to assess the reaction of the
inoculated animals [14]. This requirement for a fol-
low-up visit for the SICCT is a major cost factor, so
alternative tests requiring only a single visit are con-
sidered attractive. Animals that exhibit a stronger re-
action to the bovine tuberculin relative to the avian
tuberculin are said to be ‘reactors’, the herd is desig-
nated as a ‘breakdown’ and certain movement re-
strictions placed on the farm. Marginal results are
known as inconclusive reactors (IRs) and are retested
individually 60 days later [15]. Any reactor animal is
slaughtered and the case is only conﬁrmed following
the successful culture ofM. bovis from suspect lesions.
Currently all eligible herds in Scotland are tested
once every 4 years under the routine herd testing
(RHT) policy. Under RHT breeding bulls, females
that have calved and younger animals that have been
bought in and could be used for breeding (and are
aged >42 days) are eligible for testing [15]. There is
some local risk assessment applied, for example
herds with animals that are resident for only a short
period of time can apply for non-eligible stock (NES)
status and are exempted from testing. RHT is
supplemented by further whole herd tests, triggered by
post-movement testing of cattle moving from England
and Wales and Ireland into Scotland and contact
tracing following a conﬁrmed breakdown (Table 1).
Post-mortem surveillance is performed at the
slaughterhouse by inspecting the lungs, lymph nodes
and other viscera of all carcasses for evidence of TB
lesions. A case is conﬁrmed if M. bovis is successfully
cultured from a suspect lesion; then the herd that sent
the animals to slaughter and if necessary in-contact
herds, are followed up for further testing. The number
of animals that are sent to slaughter varies greatly
between diﬀerent types of herds.
Thus, the aims of these analyses are to:
(1) Evaluate whether slaughterhouse surveillance
alone is suﬃcient to ensure a high level of conﬁ-
dence of freedom from infection.
(2) Evaluate alternative strategies to RHT that are
based upon risk. This should incorporate both the
risk of infection and the risk of detection at the
slaughterhouse. The strategy should involve the
testing of fewer herds while not impacting greatly
on the ability of the system to detect new cases.
(3) Minimize the number of false-positive herds
identiﬁed by testing.
(4) Evaluate the interferon-gamma (IFN-c) test as an
alternative to SICCT.
METHODS
These analyses used a mixed logistic regression model
to deﬁne the probability of a herd becoming infected,
and implemented components of a stochastic simu-
lation model developed by the Veterinary Labora-
tories Agency (AHVLA meta-analysis study team,
personal communication), to calculate the probability
of a herd’s freedom from infection. The speciﬁcs of
implementing these models and adapting them to
consider the speciﬁc requirements of a surveillance
Table 1. The number of herds and animals tested by diﬀerent surveillance types between 2002 and 2008
(note that whole herd tests do not require that the entire herd is tested)
Test type
Part/whole
herd
Herds
tested
Conﬁrmed
breakdowns
Animals
tested Reactors
Conﬁrmed
reactors
RHT Whole 20 607 20 1 243 070 46 22
Tracing Part 2988 24 8400 102 38
Post-movement Part 1651 1 13 368 2 1
Post-Irish import Part 1079 12 16 439 43 15
Inconclusive reactor retests Part 1532 32 2546 187 36
RHT, Routine herd testing.
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framework for Scotland are described below and the
parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Model description
To evaluate the likelihood of herd-level freedom from
infection with bTB during a speciﬁed time period (t)
the model requires that the following parameters are
deﬁned:
(1) The probability of the herd becoming infected
during t (p(intro)). This is derived from the re-
gression model (described in the online Sup-
plementary material).
(2) The number of animals in the herd (N).
(3) The bTB surveillance implemented on the farm.
Two types of surveillance can be considered:
(a) slaughterhouse meat inspection of animals
sent to slaughter;
(b) whole herd testing (i.e. testing the entire herd).
(4) The herd-level prevalence of infection pstar.
The eﬃcacy of the surveillance system is evaluated by
calculating the herd-level test system sensitivity
(sesystem), which allows the inclusion of multiple tests.
However, in this framework only the routine ‘whole
herd’ SICCT testing and part herd slaughterhouse
testing are considered, thus the formula takes the
form:
sesystem=1x(1xseherd)(1xsepart),
in which seherd is the sensitivity of the SICCT
implemented as a herd test, and separt is the part
herd sensitivity for slaughterhouse surveillance.
The herd sensitivity for a whole herd test is calculated
as:
seherd=1x(1xseSICCT)d,
in which seSICCT is the sensitivity of the diagnostic
test. The distributions of the test sensitivities (Table 3)
were deﬁned by a meta-analysis performed by the
Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA meta-
analysis study team, personal communication;
Downs et al. [16]). The parameter d is the number of
infected animals in the herd deﬁned as:
d=Nrpstar:
The value of d is derived from the product of a beta(2,
90) distribution and the number of animals in the herd
(see Supplementary material for the derivation of this
parameter). The sensitivity for a part herd test for the
proportion of the herd that is sent to the slaughter-
house is :
separt=1x 1x
nrseslh
N
 d
,
where n is the number of animals tested (sent to
slaughter).
In these analyses the detection of reactors that do
not go on to be conﬁrmed and thereby consume re-
sources through slaughter of the unconﬁrmed re-
actors and follow-up testing on the herd is given by:
spherd=1xspnanimal,
where n=N for whole herd tests and spanimal is the
speciﬁcity of the test.
Table 2. Summary of the parameters used in this study
Parameter Deﬁnition
p(intro) The probability of the herd becoming infected during time period t
p(free) The probability of freedom from infection at time t
prior The prior probability that the herd is infected
N The number of animals in the herd
pstar The herd-level prevalence of infection
d The number of infected animals
n The number of animals that are tested
sesystem The herd-level sensitivity of the test system
seherd The sensitivity of SICCT implemented as a herd test
separt The herd-level sensitivity of a diagnostic test implemented on part of a herd
seSICCT The sensitivity of SICCT
seslh The sensitivity of slaughterhouse surveillance
spherd The herd-level speciﬁcity of a test
spanimal Speciﬁcity of a diagnostic test applied on an individual animal level
SICCT, Single intradermal comparative cervical tuberculin test.
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The probability of freedom (the posterior) at t is given
by:
p(free)=
1xpriort
(1xpriort)+priortr(1xsesystem)
,
where priort is the prior probability that the herd is
infected. The prior for t+1 is :
priort+1=((1xp(free)t)+p(intro))+((1xp(free)t)
rp(intro)):
The model was implemented in the R statistical en-
vironment [17] and run for 100 iterations. The model
was implemented for all herds in Scotland for all years
between 2002 and 2008. Proxy data for 1998–2001
were derived from the observed data from 2002 and
2003 [years for which data are available and excluding
the time-frame around the 2001 foot-and-mouth dis-
ease (FMD) epidemic] ; this was to enable a ‘burn-in’
period for the model to ensure that it was stable for
the period of simulation. Model stability was further
tested by comparing the results from 2003 to 2008
with those from just 2005 to 2008 in a sensitivity
analysis. The deﬁned time period for implementation
(t) is 1 year. As 2002 was the ﬁrst year for which there
was actual data and as this was a ‘rebound year ’ from
the 2001 FMD epidemic the statistics from this year
were found to be unstable. As a result the ﬁtted values
from 2002 were discarded. For whole herd tests over a
regular repeat period (such as 4-year testing) the start
year of the herd testing cycle (e.g. between years 1 and
4 for 4-year testing) was generated randomly for each
iteration.
Model implementation
A number of risk-based surveillance options were
explored based upon both how likely a holding is
to become infected and how likely an infection is to
be detected at the slaughterhouse. We required
that any system replacing RHT would need to
largely identify the breakdowns that historically were
identiﬁed by RHT. The following were identiﬁed as
likely determinants of the risk of infection and sub-
sequent detection (based upon the analysis of
Bessell et al. [18] and expanded in the Supplementary
material) :
(1) The size of the holding – larger holdings being at
greater risk of infection.
(2) The proportion of the farm’s total stock that
is sent to slaughter during each time period –
holdings that send less stock to the slaughter-
house require more active surveillance.
(3) Where the holding sources its stock – whether the
holding is buying in animals from high-risk
(1-year testing) areas in England, Wales and
Ireland.
These risk-based scenarios were plotted against the
minimal surveillance scenario comprising just
slaughterhouse surveillance and combined to under-
stand their importance in determining missed infec-
tions at slaughterhouse (Supplementary material).
Three diﬀerent baseline scenarios can be modelled
based upon an annual time-frame for surveillance
and assuming that slaughterhouse surveillance will
continue:
(1) Minimal model – slaughterhouse surveillance
only.
(2) Current scenario – 4-year whole herd testing and
slaughterhouse surveillance.
(3) Maximal model – annual whole herd testing and
slaughterhouse surveillance.
The maximal and minimal scenarios represent the
bounds of what can be achieved using this framework.
Herds with a low probability of disease freedom in the
minimal model are those that should be targeted in
any risk-based surveillance scheme. The risk-based
combinations were compared with the current (4-year
testing) surveillance scenario. Depending on whether
the herd is deemed to be at-risk and the identiﬁed
level of risk (herds may have diﬀerent levels of risk
Table 3. Parameters for diagnostic tests used in these analyses
Test
Sensitivity Speciﬁcity
Mean (%) Distribution Mean (%) Distribution
Slaughterhouse 69.30 beta(6.78, 3.01) 100 1
SICCT 51.11 beta(6.66, 6.37) 99.58 beta(1.19, 0.005)
IFN-c 86.19 beta(30.14, 4.83) 96.63 beta(219.1, 7.62)
SICCT, Single intradermal comparative cervical tuberculin test ; IFN-c, interferon-gamma test.
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assigned), the following time-frames for testing were
explored:
(1) Four-year testing for all risk herds.
(2) Staggered 4- and 2-year testing depending upon
the level of risk.
(3) Staggered 4-, 2- and 1-year testing depending
upon the level of risk.
Model evaluation
The risk-based scenarios were evaluated by compar-
ing their ﬁtted number of latently infected premises to
the equivalent ﬁtted values from modelling current 4-
year RHT surveillance. The following were calculated
over the period 2003–2008:
(1) The number latently infected in 2008.
(2) The annual mean number latently infected be-
tween 2003 and 2008.
The total number of detected breakdowns in each
year between 2003 and 2008 was calculated as the
diﬀerence between the model prior and posterior. The
parameter spherd gives the probability of a given herd
being a false positive (i.e. an unconﬁrmed reactor).
Therefore, the summation of spherd for all herds for a
given year gives the expected number of false positives
(Table 4).
By examining situations that require fewer annual
tests than current surveillance, a number of scenarios
were identiﬁed with testing regimens and various cut-
oﬀs selected based upon epidemiological relevance
and ease of implementation. The composition of these
scenarios was developed by exploring the determi-
nants of infection and detection across the testing
windows (both described above). Based on this the
following scenarios were more fully evaluated relative
to the number of latent infections produced by cur-
rent surveillance:
(1) Improved detection. The mean number of latently
infected herds is >5% lower than produced by
current surveillance (i.e. detecting at least one
extra infected herd). This can only be achieved
using a temporal window that includes surveil-
lance over intervals that are shorter than 4 years.
(2) Similar surveillance. The mean number of latently
infected herds is within 5% of the current sur-
veillance, for fewer herds tested.
(3) Lower detection surveillance. The mean number of
latently infected herds is between 5% and 15%
greater than current surveillance, the latter ﬁgure
is taken as a cut-oﬀ above which no surveillance
system would be considered.
Data
The data used to populate the model were derived
from VetNet and the British Cattle Movement System
(BCMS) Cattle Tracing System (CTS). The following
steps were used to derive the cattle herd data:
(1) All herds with a unique county parish holding
(CPH) number on the VetNet herd table that were
active during all of the years between 2002 and
2008 (inclusive) were identiﬁed. This comprised
12 016 herds.
(2) Of the herds identiﬁed above, only those that had
animals recorded on CTS were included; this
comprised 11 730 herds. For these the number of
animals in the herd on 1 January was calculated.
There were a total of 1 757 168 animals on 1
January 2008.
(3) The number of animals sent to slaughter from
these herds in each year was calculated. For the
purposes of this study, the holding that sent the
animal to slaughter is the last holding on which
the animal spent at least 7 days prior to slaughter.
In 2008, 5 06 239 animals were sent to slaughter
from holdings in Scotland.
Assumptions and simpliﬁcations
These analyses are dependent upon a number of as-
sumptions that must be considered when interpreting
the results :
(1) That all herds are tested. These analyses have in-
cluded herds currently exempt from testing as
NES herds.
(2) The entire herd is tested under RHT. Those ani-
mals that are not included in RHT were included
in these analyses. This is due to the complexity
of identifying stock and herds that are eligible
Table 4. The derivation of each term for each farm at
time t. The national totals for each term are given by
summing the values for all herds
Term Derivation
Probability of being latently infected 1 – p(free)t
Probability of a detected infection priort – p(free)t
Probability of being a false positive spherd
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for testing under RHT, and the impacts of this
assumption is explored in sensitivity analysis.
(3) That slaughterhouse meat inspection will con-
tinue.
(4) That current additional tests will continue to be
used such as tracings, pre- and post-movement
tests and post-import tests.
(5) That all testing is random and independent. For
example, while there will be some variability in
the test sensitivity and speciﬁcity, this is not
meaningfully clustered, and therefore no herds or
herd types have an inherently higher sensitivity
than others.
(6) That the SICCT and slaughterhouse surveillance
are independent.
(7) That SICCT is the optimal test for RHT as it is
the standard test for bTB surveillance in GB.
Sensitivity analysis was performed using the IFN-
c test.
RESULTS
Basic models
The results of the three baseline scenarios – the
maximal, minimal and current surveillance models
are summarized in Table 5. Analysis of the mean
number of animals sent to slaughter per year during
the period 2002–2008 against the mean herd size on 1
January shows a linear relationship with distinct
clustering of fattening and dairy herds (Fig. 1). While
dairy herds are typically larger, they typically have far
fewer per capita movements to slaughter compared to
fattening herds.
Risk-based methods
Following screening of possible surveillance combi-
nations using a system of matrix analysis of these risk
measures, four diﬀerent scenarios based upon identi-
fying herds that are more likely to be infected and not
detected have been identiﬁed for further consider-
ation. Under all scenarios, importing animals from
high-incidence areas was considered a high risk [of
which there were 1843 (15.7%) herds]. These are the
optimal testing scenarios for the better, similar and
two lower detection scenarios (Table 6).
The risk-based surveillance system that delivers
improved detection and freedom from disease can be
achieved through testing slightly fewer herds and an-
imals (Fig. 2, Table 5). The system that reproduces
similar levels of detection to those seen currently can
be achieved through testing 697 fewer herds
and 122184 fewer animals (Table 5). The two ‘lower
detection’ scenarios were developed because one of-
fers a saving of 40% of the number of herds tested
(1768 herd tests per annum compared to 2933 under
the current scenario) but would have missed a large
number of the breakdowns that were identiﬁed by
RHT (Table 5). The second oﬀers a smaller saving in
terms of herds tested – a reduction of 28% (2110 herd
tests per annum compared to 2933 under the current
scenario) but would have identiﬁed 32 of the break-
downs that were identiﬁed by RHT (Table 6).
Sensitivity analyses
The current model tests all animals rather than all
eligible animals. Accordingly, to check the results for
Table 5. Summary of test results. The current system which forms the baseline for comparison is highlighted in
bold.
Surveillance scenario
Interval
(years)
Herds
tested p.a.
Cattle
tested p.a.
Fitted no.
of detected
infections, total
Latent infections
False
positives 20082008 Mean
Baseline scenarios
Slaughterhouse only n.a. 0 0 76.25 43.60 33.78 0
Current 4 2933 439 292 95.08 19.00 16.96 64.27
Maximum 1 11730 1 757 168 104.39 2.81 2.69 255.19
Risk-based surveillance
Better 2/4 2509 388 812 96.59 17.62 16.03 56.03
Similar 4 2236 317 108 94.53 19.74 17.51 48.69
Lower detection 1 4 1768 209 425 92.81 21.71 18.86 37.37
Lower detection 2 1/2/4 2110 441 823 95.17 19.56 17.30 53.86
Interferon-gamma test
Current 4 2933 439 292 97.70 13.85 12.62 2137
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Table 6. Composition of the risk-based surveillance scenarios
Criteria Points
Testing interval
by points score No. of herds (%) bTB (RHT)*
Improved
Slaughtering<25% of stock +1 0 points=no testing 2687 (22.9) 26 (1)
1 point=4 year testing 8052 (68.6) 52(26)
Receiving ‘high risk’ animals in>3 years and
slaughtering<50% of stock
+1 2 points=2 year testing 991 (8.4) 20 (9)
Similar
Slaughtering<25% of stock and/or
receiving ‘high risk’animals in
>3 years and slaughtering
<40% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 2788 (23.8) 29 (1)
1 point=4 year testing 8942 (76.2) 69 (35)
Lower detection 1
Slaughtering<12.5% of stock and/or receiving
‘high risk’ animals in>3 years and slaughtering
<25% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 4658 (39.7) 55 (15)
1 point=4 year testing 7072 (60.3) 43 (21)
Lower detection 2
Slaughtering>25% of stock x1 x1 or 0 points=no testing 4971 (42.4) 19 (3)
Slaughtering<5% of stock +1 1 point=4 year testing 5340 (45.5) 58 (22)
Receiving ‘high risk’ animals in>3 years +1 2 points=2 year testing 1288 (11.0) 20 (11)
Having>100 animals +1 3 points=annual testing 131 (1.1) 1 (0)
bTB, Bovine tuberculosis ; RHT, routine herd testing.
* bTB is the number of conﬁrmed breakdowns between 2003 and 2008 that fell into that category. RHT is the breakdowns
that were detected by RHT.
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sensitivity to the number of animals that are actually
tested, the number of animals tested in the model was
set equal to the number tested in the previous test that
is recorded for that herd on the VetNet database.
The results, with the exception of the ‘ lower detec-
tion 2’ scenario were not substantially diﬀerent.
Furthermore, the results were insensitive to the selec-
tion of testing period; when the period 2005–2008 was
analysed the results were similar to those presented
here, with the exception of the ‘ lower detection 2’
scenario, which required a large increase in the num-
bers of animals and herds tested. Testing using the
IFN-c test resulted in a substantially larger number of
false positives due to the relatively poor speciﬁcity of
the IFN-c test (Tables 3 and 5).
DISCUSSION
This paper has described the development of a model
to evaluate strategies for risk-based surveillance
for bTB. The strategies developed here provide dif-
ferent balances between the requirements for disease
detection and minimizing the surveillance eﬀort, and
all have broadly similar eﬃcacy to detect infections,
compared to the current 4-year RHT. The levels of
detection under current surveillance can be replicated
by testing 76% of the herds and animals that are
currently tested. This strategy would have included all
but one of the breakdowns that were identiﬁed
through RHT and in the model provides statistically
equivalent results.
Of the scenarios developed here, the improved,
similar and one of the lower detection scenarios
selected holdings for testing based upon the pro-
portion of stock slaughtered and the number of bat-
ches of high-risk animals moving onto the farm. They
diﬀered only in terms of the cut-oﬀ thresholds for in-
clusion (Table 6). The fourth scenario – the second of
the lower detection scenarios included the testing of
large herds as well as those that slaughter few animals
and import animals from high-incidence areas.
Three diﬀerent temporal windows were in-
vestigated: the current 4-year testing and two stag-
gered systems: 1-, 2- and 4-year testing and 2-/4-year
testing. Diﬀerent solutions emerged from these testing
windows. The results show that current 4-year testing
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Fig. 2. Cumulative distribution plot of the probability of each herd harbouring undetected infection at the end of each model
time step for all herds in Scotland from the three baseline models. The ‘Slaughterhouse only’ scenario represents a minimal
model (the lowest amount of surveillance that could be under) and the ‘Annual routine herd testing’ scenario is the maximal
model (the most surveillance that could be undertaken under the current testing regimens). The remaining four scenarios are
the four risk-based surveillance systems. The x axis has been truncated for clarity.
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is eﬀective. However, if greater freedom from infec-
tion were desirable, then testing certain herds on a
more regular basis would facilitate this.
The principal conventional risk factor for being
a breakdown herd that was incorporated in the
risk-based surveillance strategies is the importing of
animals from high-risk areas of England, Wales and
Ireland. Of the 1843 herds that import animals from
high-incidence areas, 1267 (69%) would be tested
under this strategy; the remainder slaughter >40%
of stock and are exempt (Table 6). Two of the systems
presented here require testing herds that slaughter
<25% of stock per year (Table 6). This ensures that
those herds that would not on average replace their
entire stock over a 4-year period are tested for bTB.
During the period 2003–2008 there were 98 break-
downs; 32 of the cases were identiﬁed by slaughter-
houses and 36 by RHT (either directly or by triggering
an IR retest that resulted in a conﬁrmed breakdown).
However, despite comprising only RHT and slaugh-
terhouse surveillance, the model predicts around 95
cases detected. This is because the remainder of the
surveillance is made up of other types of testing not
made up for here, such as pre- and post-movement
tests and tracings. These are not included in this
analysis ; however, in essence the model is allowing for
their detection at slaughterhouse or by routine sur-
veillance at a later time point ; these factors are not
expected to aﬀect the scenarios modelled here.
However, for the system to function eﬀectively
slaughterhouse surveillance must be performed to an
equal standard across slaughterhouses. Variation is
accounted for by sampling from a distribution, but
this does not allow for diﬀerences in ascertainment
that may exist between slaughterhouses. Any failure
to implement surveillance to a uniform standard
throughout the country may lead to a clustering of
latently infected premises and consequent disease
spread in certain areas.
The surveillance scenarios presented here are taken
from a continuum and can be adapted and tailored to
speciﬁc needs. Of the four scenarios developed there
were two scenarios that produced up to 15% lower
surveillance. Two ‘lower ’ scenarios were chosen for
illustration because they oﬀered diﬀerent advantages.
One missed 15 of the herds that were detected by
current RHT but involved many fewer tests, while the
other scenario performed better but required the
testing of many more animals (Tables 5 and 6). It also
had the advantage of ‘penalizing’ those herds that
were at greater risk, especially due to importation.
Thus it would serve as a disincentive to this behav-
iour. The similar and the better detection scenarios
were variants of each other and both detected 35 of 36
RHT breakdowns (Table 6). Therefore, the ‘similar’
scenario that requires less testing is recommended.
The systems presented here require the continued
implementation of the standard SICCT with the dis-
advantages already described. However, at present
there are no credible alternative tests. The mean
speciﬁcity of the IFN-c test is 96.6%. While the im-
proved sensitivity of the test means that there is
greater detection, the lower speciﬁcity in a low-
prevalence setting with a large number of animals per
herd results in around 50% of herds returning at least
one false positive. However, the development of such
tests and test combinations should be continually
monitored and tested to investigate whether they oﬀer
an improvement to the scenarios presented here.
These surveillance systems are very eﬀective at en-
suring that not only are the herds with the highest risk
of harbouring infected animals tested, but also herds
that recorded a breakdown are detected, thereby vali-
dating the model. In addition to this, the improved
targeting of surveillance means that fewer false posi-
tives are found, as fewer animals are tested. As the
strategies are based upon the proportion of stock
slaughtered, herds that are not detected by routine
surveillance are sending suﬃcient animals to slaughter
to ensure that the slaughterhouse picks up infections.
Slaughterhouse surveillance will be assisted by pre-
movement testing which minimizes the movement of
infected animals between holdings within Scotland.
Pre- and post-movement testing is also routinely per-
formed on virtually all imports from England and
Ireland [19]. In spite of these movement tests, the risk-
factor model demonstrates that the type of holdings
that import higher risk animals are more likely to
become infected. However, these holdings should be
tested by risk-based RHT in addition to continued
pre- and post-movement testing. Out of 36 break-
downs, the 35 that were identiﬁed by RHT are in-
cluded in the ‘similar’ surveillance strategy. However,
only 18/32 slaughterhouse identiﬁed breakdowns
and 6/14 breakdowns that were identiﬁed by epidemi-
ological tracing are included for RHT surveillance in
the ‘similar ’ risk-based system. Therefore, these other
testing systems must continue to be implemented, in
order to detect these extra breakdowns.
In conclusion, with increased demand for more
eﬀective and eﬃcient surveillance for livestock dis-
eases, risk-based surveillance presents an attractive
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opportunity to both better our ability to detect dis-
ease, while making considerable cost savings. This
opportunity is enhanced by the availability of detailed
demographic and livestock movement databases, al-
lowing for more precise identiﬁcation of herds and
premises at risk. This will only be enhanced by the
likely adoption of electronic tagging at the individual
level. While our analysis pertains only to the surveil-
lance of bTB in Scotland, similar approaches could be
envisaged for targeting surveillance of both bTB and
other infectious livestock diseases throughout the
European Union, where such detailed databases are
becoming widespread.
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